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What are the Consequences of Consequentiality?
Abstract
We offer an empirical test of a theoretical result in the contingent valuation litera-
ture. Specifically, it has been argued from a theoretical point of view that survey partic-
ipants who perceive a survey to be “consequential” will respond to questions truthfully
regardless of the degree of perceived consequentiality. Using survey data from the Iowa
Lakes Project, we test this supposition. Specifically, we employ a Bayesian treatment
effect model in which the degree of perceived consequentiality, measured as an ordinal
response, is permitted to have a structural impact on willingness to pay (WTP) for
a hypothetical environmental improvement. We test our theory by determining if the
WTP distributions are the same for each value of the ordinal response.
In our survey data, a subsample of individuals were randomly assigned supporting
information suggesting that their responses to the questionnaires were important and
will have an impact on policy decisions. In conjunction with a Bayesian posterior
simulator, we use this source of exogenous variation to identify the structural impacts
of consequentiality perceptions on willingness to pay, while controlling for the potential
of confounding on unobservables. We find evidence consistent with the “knife-edge”
theoretical results, namely that the willingness to pay distributions are equal among
those believing the survey to be at least minimally consequential, and different for
those believing that the survey is irrelevant for policy purposes.
2
1 Introduction
The question regarding the accuracy with which stated preference methods can be used to
ascertain individual valuations for environmental goods and services continues to be hotly
debated in the environmental literature. A wide variety of empirical tests have been con-
ducted to date, including studies checking for agreement with other elicitation methods (e.g.,
revealed preference techniques such as recreation demand or hedonic pricing) or contrasting
revealed and stated preference responses in an experimental setting. While such tests are
quite informative, they are often context-specific and reduced form in nature, not addressing
the fundamental issues as to why and under what conditions stated preference methods will
succeed or fail.
In contrast, Carson, Groves, and Machina (CGM, 2000), by detailing the incentive and in-
formational properties of stated preference questions, provide the basis for discerning key
elements of a successful contingent valuation (CV) exercise. Specifically, CGM argue that
respondents can be predicted to answer a dichotomous-choice referendum question in a man-
ner that is consistent with expected utility maximization if they perceive the survey to be
“consequential.” That is, if respondents believe the result of the survey might potentially
influence an outcome they care about, they will answer CV questions truthfully since it is
their dominant strategy to do so. If accurate, this result has clear and important impli-
cations regarding how a researcher should handle survey responses: all data arising from
respondents who believe the survey is at least minimally consequential can be assumed to
provide truthful answers to survey questions.
There have been several studies to date testing this theoretical consequentiality condition and
its impact on respondents’ preference revelation. These, to our knowledge, have been almost
exclusively carried out through field experiments. Though useful, these experimental studies
have largely taken place outside of the context of an actual CV exercise and require the
analyst to inform participants of the degree of consequentiality associated with the exercise.
These field experiments have the important advantage that the researcher can directly control
the degree of consequentiality, but their disadvantage is that this direct control is not typical
of CV surveys. Thus, findings from such field experiments may be difficult to transfer to the
survey arena.
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In this paper we take a different but complementary approach, eliciting respondents’ per-
ception of consequentiality directly in a CV survey. Specifically, we use respondents’ percep-
tions of consequentiality elicited in two CV surveys (the 2003 and 2005 Iowa Lakes Surveys)
to determine whether individuals have different perceptions concerning the degree of con-
sequentiality of the valuation exercise and whether these perceptions affects respondents’
willingness to pay (WTP) in the pattern predicted by the CGM theoretical work. In both
surveys, respondents were asked whether they would vote in favor of a referendum to improve
water quality at a lake. Respondents were also asked to answer, on a scale from one to five,
how likely it was that the survey results would influence decisions in the state concerning
water quality programs. Thus, a measure of the degree to which respondents perceived the
survey as consequential was directly elicited. Based on the CGM arguments, respondents
who do not believe that the survey is consequential should be omitted from the sample for
estimation purposes, since they do not have an incentive to respond to the referendum ques-
tion truthfully. Additionally, the distribution of WTP from respondents with differing views
concerning the degree of consequentiality could be tested for equality, thereby testing the
fundamental CGM argument.
Since respondents who indicate a high degree of consequentiality may do so because they
also place a high value in the proposed water quality improvement project, there is a po-
tential endogeneity, or unobserved confounding problem. To address this concern, a split
sample treatment was administered in the 2005 survey. Specifically, half of the sample was
provided with a highlighted article from the Iowa Conservationist — the magazine of the
Iowa Department of Natural Resources (IDNR), the state agency with primary responsibil-
ity for water quality control — indicating that IDNR was already using results from the
survey in their policy decisions and planned to continue to do so. Our assumption, which is
borne out empirically, is that the presentation of this information will positively affect the
respondents’ perceived degree of consequentiality. This exogenous treatment, which should
only impact willingness to pay through its indirect effect on perceived consequentiality, will
aid us in estimating the “causal” impacts of consequentiality perceptions on WTP, as we
will describe below.
Making use of the information treatment in the 2005 survey, we can then explore the im-
pact of perceived consequentiality on willingness to pay within the framework of a standard
triangular treatment-response model. We proceed using a Bayesian approach and derive
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and employ a new algorithm that improves upon standard estimation methods, and can
be applied by other practitioners seeking to fit models with a similar structure. Specifi-
cally, since our consequentiality responses are ordinal, our model must contend with the
estimation of cutpoint values. It is well-documented in the literature that standard Gibbs
sampling schemes in such models can suffer from very poor mixing, particularly in moder-
ately large data sets, thus producing imprecise and potentially inaccurate posterior inference
[e.g., Cowles (1996), Nandram and Chen (1996)].3 Our proposed posterior simulator offers
significant improvements by sampling the cutpoints, latent willingness to pay and latent
consequentiality variables in a single step rather than sampling each component from its
corresponding complete posterior conditional distribution. The application of our algorithm
to this data reveals results that are broadly consistent with CGM’s theoretical predictions.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of related studies
in the literature, while Section 3 describes the Iowa Lakes Project and the data used in
our empirical analysis. Both the model and the simulator used to characterize the posterior
distribution of the parameters of interest are described in Section 4. Details of the posterior
simulator are deferred to an appendix. Section 5 provides the empirical results and the paper
concludes with a summary in section 6.
2 Related Literature
Our investigation is certainly not the first to test this consequentiality condition on respon-
dents’ preference revelation. Cummings et al. (1997), for example, conducted an experiment
involving real and hypothetical referenda to compare how respondents behave in these two
settings. They find that respondents are more likely to vote “yes” in the hypothetical setting
than in the real setting and conclude that hypothetical referenda yield biased estimates of
WTP. Cummings and Taylor (1998) explore this issue further by investigating how the hypo-
thetical bias of the dichotomous choice referendum varies with the degree of consequentiality.
They find that participants in different treatments, including hypothetical, probabilistic, and
3“Poor mixing” in simulation based approaches, such as Gibbs sampling, refers to the problem of the
algorithm yielding high serial correlation among the draws from the distribution of interest. This high
correlation, in turn, implies that a large number of simulation draws are required to accurately estimate
characteristics of the distribution, such as its mean, mode or variance.
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real referendum, behave significantly different from one another. Specifically, the probability
of a respondent voting “yes” falls if the probability of the referendum being binding rises.
They also find that respondents’ voting behavior is significantly different from an actual
referendum unless there is high probability that the referendum will be binding (e.g., greater
than fifty percent).
Carson et al. (2004) conduct a similar study with a field experiment. In the experiment,
participants were informed the probability of the dichotomous choice referendum being bind-
ing. In contrast to Cummings and Taylor (1998), they find the knife-edge theoretical results
suggested in CGM: as long as the probability of consequentiality exceeds zero even by a
small amount, participants respond in the same manner as in an actual referendum. They
suggest that results from inconsequential (hypothetical) referendum should not be used to
make inference about how CV works in consequential referendum.
Bulte et al. (2005) explore the impact of consequentiality in a survey setting by telling
respondents that the results of the survey will be available to policy makers. They do not
directly elicit respondents’ reactions to this information. Their WTP estimates obtained from
the survey with “cheap talk” and the survey with a consequentiality device are significantly
smaller than those obtained in a purely hypothetical survey. In addition, the WTP estimates
obtained from the survey with cheap talk are not significantly different from the WTPs
obtained from the survey with a consequential device. Their results are also consistent with
the CGM predictions.
3 The Iowa Lakes Data
This study employs data from two years of the “Iowa Lakes Project,” a four-year study
and panel data collection effort aimed at understanding recreational use and the value of
water quality in the primary recreational lakes of Iowa. The project began in 2002 with mail
surveys sent to a random sample of 8,000 Iowa residents, obtaining detailed information
regarding their visitation patterns to approximately 130 lakes, as well as standard socio-
demographic data (e.g., age, education, income and gender). In subsequent years, surveys
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were sent to those households completing a survey in the prior year.4 Standard follow-up
procedures were followed in each year of the survey, including a postcard reminder mailed
two weeks after the initial mailing and a second copy of the survey mailed one month later.
Households were provided a $10 incentive for completing the survey each year, helping to
provide for response rates ranging 62 to 72 percent across the four years of the project.
The contingent valuation (and consequentiality) responses modeled in the current paper were
included only in the 2003 and 2005 versions of the questionnaire. In 2003, a referendum style
CV question was posed to estimate WTP for a water quality improvement project at one of
eight focus lakes targeted in the study. These lakes were selected in consultation with the
Iowa Department of Natural Resources. In addition to being geographically dispersed, the
target lakes are each of policy interest since various restoration projects are being considered
for them. Each respondent was asked a CV question for only one of the focus lakes. The
survey described the current water quality information of the lake, including water clarity,
water color, water odor, health concerns from algae blooms and bacteria level, and variety
and quantity of fish. A photograph, illustrating the water clarity and water color, was
provided to help respondents picture the current water quality of the focus lake vividly.
Prior to the main valuation question, cheap talk text was used to remind respondents about
the incentive and information properties of stated preference question in a further attempt
to elicit truthful responses to the CV questions.
A water quality improvement project regarding the focus lake was then proposed that out-
lined the methods to achieve the water quality improvement at each lake, such as dredging
and building protection strips around the perimeter. Respondents were asked whether they
would vote in favor of the referendum to improve the lake where bid values (ranging from
$100 to $600 payable over a five year period) were randomly assigned to households in the
sample receiving the survey. Finally, the perceived consequentiality of the survey was elicited
from respondents by asking the following question: “How likely do you think it is that the
results of surveys such as this one will affect decisions about water quality in Iowa lakes?”
Possible responses to this question ranged from 1 to 5 where a 1 denoted “no effect at all”
(i.e., completely inconsequential) and 5 denoted “definite” effects.
4A second random sample was added in the panel in 2003 to fill in for non-deliverable surveys in 2003
and return the sample to a total of 8000 households. No additional households were added after 2003.
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Table 1: 2003 Summary Statistics By Level of Consequentiality
Variable c = 1 c = 2 c = 3 c = 4 c = 5
Num. Observations (n) 307 832 1995 1294 356
Percentage YES 0.13 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38
Percent Not Visited 0.48 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.22
Percent Male 0.70 0.65 0.68 0.69 0.65
Income/ $1,000 54.1 58.8 55.9 58.2 49.4
Std. Income (40.7) (37.8) (34.7) (38.1) (37.3)
Age 58.31 53.42 53.22 51.29 55.51
Std. Age (16.41) (15.85) (15.61) (15.27) (16.73)
College 0.55 0.68 0.68 0.74 0.64
Table 1 lists a summary of the data obtained in 2003. In our sample, the more consequential
the respondents view the survey, the higher the observed “yes” rate to the proposed refer-
endum. The “yes” rate rises monotonically from 13% when respondents believe the survey
is inconsequential to 38% when respondents believe the survey is definitely consequential.
Also of note, respondents who do not visit the lakes tend to view the survey inconsequen-
tial. As Figure 1 illustrates, the voting pattern of respondents who report any degree of
consequentiality (i.e., anyone who reports a 2, 3, 4, or 5 to the consequentiality question) is
consistent with economic theory: the “yes” rate falls as the bid value rises. In this sample,
it is also the case that the “yes” rate of the inconsequential group is clearly lower than that
of consequential group at each bid value.
Recall that the CGM knife-edge result states that respondents’ vote on the CV question
will be the same as an actual referendum as long as the respondents perceive that there
is even a small chance that the survey is consequential. To test this conjecture, we could
estimate a simple, single-equation WTP function for each level of reported consequentiality
and test whether the distributions are statistically different from one another. However, as
noted in the introduction, there is the potential endogeneity of respondents’ answers to the
consequentiality question. In particular, respondents who have a high WTP may believe the
survey is consequential due to their perceptions of the importance of the project. Likewise,
respondents who indicated a low degree of consequentiality may do so because they place a
low value in the proposed water quality improvement project.
To control for this potential endogeneity, a split sample treatment was randomly administered
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Figure 1: 2003 Percentage “Yes” by Bid Value for the Five Consequentiality Groups
in the 2005 Iowa Lakes survey.5 In doing so, we took advantage of a magazine article and
letter from the director of the state’s Department of Natural Resources that had recently
been published concerning how results from the Iowa Lakes Project were being used by the
department to prioritize water quality projects. Specifically, half of the sample was provided
with a copy of the director’s letter and an article from the Iowa Conservationist indicating
that the IDNR was already using results from the surveys in their policy decisions and
planned to continue to do so. This information was also highlighted in the cover letter to
the respondents. Thus, direct evidence of consequentiality was applied to this (randomly
selected) subsample. The exogenous treatment to respondents’ perception of consequentiality
allows us to separate the impact of consequentiality in the CV responses. The following
section outlines a triangular treatment-response model of the 2005 data.
5The consequentiality questions were included in only a portion of the 2005 survey, so that the final
sample available in 2005 is 1996.
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4 Brief Description of Model and Associated Posterior
Simulator
To test for the potential existence of differential impacts of perceived consequentiality on
willingness to pay, we consider the following two equation system:6
c∗i = xciβc + ²ci (1)
w∗i = xwiβw + ciδc + ²wi (2)
where [
²ci
²wi
] ∣∣∣∣xci,xwi iid∼ N [( 00
)
,
(
1 σcw
σcw σ
2
w,
)]
.
Equation (1) corresponds to the latent “consequentiality” equation, while equation (2) cor-
responds to the latent “willingness to pay” equation. The latent c∗i and w
∗
i are not observed,
but their values generate an observed binary willingness to pay indicator wi and reported
consequentiality variable ci. In our data, ci takes on 5 different ordered values, ranging
from regarding the survey as being completely irrelevant to the making of policy (ci = 1)
to regarding the survey as having a definite impact on policy (ci = 5). We thus relate the
observables wi and ci to their latent values as follows:
wi =
{
1 if w∗i ≥ Bi
0 if w∗i < Bi,
ci =

1 if −∞ < c∗i ≤ 0
2 if 0 < c∗i ≤ α3
3 if α3 < c
∗
i ≤ α4
4 if α4 < c
∗
i ≤ α5
5 if α5 < c
∗
i <∞,
where Bi is a hypothetical price (bid) proposed to individual i and ci in (2) is a 1× 5 vector
with a one in the cthi column and zeros elsewhere.
7 The parameter vector δc (within the
treatment-response framework of (1) and (2) and with a valid exclusion restriction or instru-
ment in xc) is commonly interpreted as capturing the “causal” impact of consequentiality
categories on WTP. The jth element of δc, δcj, denotes the parameter associated with the
event that ci = j. For example, the willingness to pay for an individual reporting a perceived
consequentiality of, say, ci = 3 is given by w
∗
i = xwiβw+ δc3+ ²wi. Thus, differences in WTP
among individual respondents due to differences in their perceived consequentiality of the
survey should be captured by variations among the δcj’s.
6We adopt the convention of using boldface to denote vector or matrix quantities and capital letters to
denote matrices.
7Note, with this formulation of the model, an intercept must be excluded from xwi.
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4.1 A Bayesian Approach to Estimation
In practice, a variety of methods can be employed to fit the model in (1) and (2). We have
experimented with some traditional alternatives, such as simulated maximum likelihood, and
found it difficult to obtain successful convergence and good performance, even under ideal
conditions with correct model specification. Instead, we choose to employ a Bayesian esti-
mation approach with data augmentation [e.g., Tanner and Wong (1987), Koop, Poirier and
Tobias (2007, chapter 14)], which is quite similar in spirit to classical likelihood-based tech-
niques, and is indistinguishable from these alternatives in large sample sizes when suitably
“diffuse” or “non-informative” priors are employed.
Simply adopting the Bayesian methodology, however, is not a guarantee of good performance
and, indeed, some important complications arise concerning how best to estimate the param-
eters of our equation system under this approach. For example, with typical conjugate priors
(i.e., priors that yield posteriors of the same form), fitting the model in (1)-(2) using the
standard Gibbs sampler (an algorithm that iteratively samples from the complete posterior
conditionals for each set of parameters) is reasonably straight-forward, following the work
of Albert and Chib (1993).8 However, the standard Gibbs sampler in these types of models
can suffer from slow mixing, particularly in large data sets. Thus, unless something is done
to improve the standard algorithm, use of Bayesian techniques offers little or no improve-
ment over these other alternatives. To this end, we offer a refinement of the standard Gibbs
algorithm which offers substantial performance improvements.
First, we introduce a reparameterization, following the suggestion of Nandram and Chen
(1996) in the context of a single-equation ordered probit model. Specifically, we let γ = α−15
and define x˜ ≡ γx. [That is, the ·˜ notation simply denotes the operation of taking the original
variable and multiplying it by γ.] Multiplying (1) by γ and adjusting the rule mapping the
latent c∗i into the observed ci produces the following equivalent model:
8A (conditionally) conjugate prior is a prior that yields a (conditional) posterior distribution of the same
functional form.
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c˜∗i = xciβ˜c + ²˜ci (3)
w∗i = xwiβw + ciδc + ²wi (4)
where [
²˜ci
²wi
] ∣∣∣∣xci,xwi iid∼ N [( 00
)
,
(
γ2 γσcw
γσcw σ
2
u
)]
,
wi =
{
1 if w∗i ≥ Bi
0 if w∗i < Bi,
ci =

1 if −∞ < c˜∗i ≤ 0
2 if 0 < c˜∗i ≤ α˜3
3 if α˜3 < c˜
∗
i ≤ α˜4
4 if α˜4 < c˜
∗
i ≤ 1
3 if 1 < c˜∗i <∞.
Let
Σ˜ =
(
σ˜2c σ˜cw
σ˜cw σ
2
w
)
=
(
γ2 γσcw
γσcw σ
2
w
)
.
We choose to work with the parameters:9
β˜ = [β˜
′
c β
′
w δ
′
c]
′ and Σ˜−1
rather than the original parameterization of the model. The primary reasons for doing this
are threefold. First, the reparameterization helps to improve the mixing of the posterior
simulations [e.g., Nandram and Chen (1996)], as freeing up the variance parameter rather
restricting it to unity tends to reduce the lagged autocorrelations among the parameter draws.
Second, the reparameterization eliminates one component of the cutpoint vector (which is
important in our case since α˜ is two-dimensional, and routines for calculating bivariate, but
not trivariate, normal probabilities are readily available).10 Finally, the reparameterization
eliminates the diagonal restriction on the 2 × 2 covariance matrix, enabling the use of a
Wishart prior on Σ˜
−1
and a standard Gibbs step for sampling its elements.11
Since the structural parameters βc, σcw, σ
2
w and α = [α3 α4 α5]
′ (rather than their transfor-
mations) are ultimately of interest, we can, of course, recover these by using the appropriate
9We do not, however, take up the issue of the induced priors on the original structural parameters.
10The appendix provides details regarding the specifics of the required calculations for sampling the trans-
formed cutpoints.
11This latter point should probably be regarded as a minor contribution in light of the fact that one can
simply write, for example, ²wi = σcw²ci+ui, with ui independent of ²ci, substitute this into equation (2), and
then develop a posterior simulator. See, e.g., Li (1998) and Deb, Munkin and Trivedi (2006) for examples
of this strategy.
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inverse transformations at each iteration of the sampler:
βc = β˜c/γ, σ²u = σ˜²u/γ, α = [(α˜3/γ) (α˜4/γ) γ
−1]′.
4.2 Priors and the Joint Posterior
As fully described in the appendix, we fit this model using Gibbs sampling coupled with
the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm and auxiliary variable Gibbs [e.g., Damien et al. (1999)].
Before talking about the specifics of this algorithm, we must first derive our augmented
posterior distribution. This augmented posterior involves adding the latent c˜∗ and w∗ to
the joint posterior distribution. Under prior independence this joint distribution can be
represented as:
p(c˜∗,w∗, β˜, Σ˜, α˜|c,w) ∝ p(c,w|c˜∗,w∗, β˜, Σ˜, α˜)p(c˜∗,w∗|β˜, Σ˜, α˜)p(β˜)p(Σ˜)p(α) (5)
= p(α)p(β˜)p(Σ˜)
n∏
i=1
p(c˜i, wi|c˜∗i , w∗i , β˜, Σ˜,α)p(c˜∗i , w∗i |β˜, Σ˜),
where the product term follows from the assumed (conditional) independence across obser-
vations. For the first term on the right-hand side of this product, note
p(ci, wi|c˜∗i , w∗i , β˜, Σ˜, α˜) = p(ci|wi, c˜∗i , w∗i , β˜, Σ˜, α˜)p(wi|c˜∗i , w∗i , β˜, Σ˜)
= p(ci|c˜∗i , α˜)p(wi|w∗i )
where
p(ci|c˜∗i , α˜) = I(α˜ci < c˜∗i ≤ α˜ci+1) (6)
with I(·) denoting the standard indicator function, and
p(wi|w∗i ) = I(wi = 0)I(w∗i < Bi) + I(wi = 1)I(w∗i ≥ Bi). (7)
Apart from the priors, the remaining piece in our joint posterior in (5) follows immediately
from our normality assumption:
c˜∗i , w
∗
i |β˜, Σ˜ ind∼ N
([
xciβ˜c
xwiβw + ciδc
]
, Σ˜
)
.
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The model is completed by choosing priors of the forms:
β˜ ∼ N(µβ,Vβ) (8)
Σ˜
−1 ∼ W (R, ν) (9)
p(α˜) = p(α˜3)p(α˜4|α˜3) = I(0 < α˜3 < 1) 1
1− α˜3 I(α˜3 < α˜4 < 1). (10)
For the last of these three priors, we impose the ordering restriction on the cutpoints. Un-
conditionally, we specify a prior for the smallest transformed cutpoint, α˜3 which is uniform
over its support, while α˜3 is specified to be conditionally uniform over (α˜3, 1).
The posterior simulator for fitting this model is completely described in the appendix. It is
worth noting here, however, a second refinement of our algorithm relative to the standard
Gibbs method. Specifically, we utilize a blocking step to sample a group of parameters
jointly, rather than conditionally, thus significantly improving the mixing of our posterior
simulations. That is, our algorithm employs a blocking procedure wherein the 2 × 1 vector
of transformed cutpoints (α˜) and latent data (c˜∗, w∗) are sampled together in a single
step rather than sampled from their respective conditional posterior distributions. The
clear need for such an algorithm was motivated by generated data experiments suggesting
poor mixing of the simulated cutpoints when utilizing a standard Gibbs sampler for both
the reparameterized and original representation of the model.12 In cases where objects of
interest are functions of the cutpoints, such as the WTP distribution described below, the
improved mixing offered by our algorithm would seem to offer a substantial benefit.
4.3 Willingness to Pay
As we noted in the introduction, a primary focus of our paper involves the calculation
and comparison of WTP distributions for individuals with varying degrees of perceived
consequentiality. To this end, we consider a posterior predictive exercise and seek to obtain
the WTP distribution for a hypothetical out-of-sample agent with observed characteristics
xcf and xwf and consequentiality response cf = j. The model in (3)-(4), assumed to hold for
this agent’s outcomes, implies that the posterior predictive willingness to pay distribution
12Again, we refer here to the case where no blocking steps are employed, and the cutpoints are drawn
element-by-element from their (uniform) posterior conditional distributions.
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for this representative agent, conditioned on the model parameters Γ, is given as
p(w∗f |cf = j,Γ) = p(w∗f |α˜j < c˜∗f ≤ α˜j+1,Γ)
=
[
Pr(α˜j < c˜
∗
f ≤ α˜j+1)
∣∣Γ]−1 ∫ α˜j+1
α˜j
p(w∗f , c˜
∗
f |Γ)dc˜∗f .
Factoring the latter distribution into the conditional c˜∗f |w∗f and the marginal for w∗f enables
evaluation of the integral. Specifically, we obtain13
p(w∗f |cf = j,Γ) =
[
Φ
(
α˜j+1 − xcfβc − [σ˜cw/σ2w](w∗f − xwfβw − δcj)
σ˜c
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)
− (11)
Φ
(
α˜j − xcfβc − [σ˜cw/σ2w](w∗f − xwfβw − δcj)
σ˜c
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)]
φ(w∗f ;xwfβc + δcj, σ
2
w)
Φ
(
α˜j+1−xcfβc
σ˜c
)
− Φ
(
α˜j−xcfβc
σ˜c
) .
In practice, we would like to calculate a variety of statistics associated with this willingness
to pay distribution. For example, quantities like the posterior mean, posterior standard
deviation, and posterior median (which is critical for determining whether or not a particular
referendum is likely to pass under majority vote) are certainly of interest and are policy
relevant.
Since these quantities are not easily calculated analytically, given the rather messy form
of (11), it seems desirable to pursue a numerical alterative by obtaining draws from (11)
and using these draws to calculate any statistic of interest. However, (11) is not of an
immediately recognizable functional form, thus calling into question the feasibility of this
numerical scheme. It can be shown, however, (a proof is available upon request), that a
draw from (11) can be obtained by the following procedure:
First, sample
z∗f ∼ TN(zf ,zf )(0, 1)
where TN(a,b)(µ, σ
2) denotes a normal distribution with mean µ and variance σ2 truncated
to lie in the interval (a, b),
zf =
α˜j − xcfβc
σ˜c
and zf =
α˜j+1 − xcfβc
σ˜c
.
Then, set
w∗f = pi0f + pi1z
∗
f + pi2²,
13Note that this specification reduces to the marginal for w∗f when ρcw (and thus ˜σcw) equals zero.
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where
² ∼ N(0, 1), pi0f = xwfβc + δcj, pi1 = σwρ˜cw, and pi2 = σw
√
1− ρ˜2cw
as a draw from (11).14 The above procedure provides a simple to implement series of steps
(i.e., they only require drawing from standard distributions) for sampling from the WTP
distribution directly, whence any feature of this distribution can be calculated. In practice,
the steps above are repeated for each post-convergence simulation Γ, and the collection of
the resulting draws are then used to calculate the desired quantity or quantities. To our
knowledge, a description of such a method in the presence of an endogeneity problem offers
a new and hopefully valuable contribution to the literature.
Beyond these specific statistics, it is also of interest to provide a plot of the full posterior
predictive distribution. While (11) is conditioned on the parameters Γ, the Bayesian ap-
proach handles parameter uncertainty by integrating the parameters out of the conditional
posterior predictive. In the context of our problem, we would like to obtain
p(w∗f |cf = j, c,w) =
∫
p(w∗f |cf = j,Γ)p(Γ|c,w)dΓ, (12)
since w∗f , in the case of random sampling, is independent of the past data c,w given Γ.
Simply plotting the left-hand side of (12) can be done without having to take draws from
the (conditional) posterior predictive, as described above. Instead, we can provide a “Rao-
Blackwell” approximation of this posterior predictive by noting
p(w∗f |cf = j, c,w) ≈
1
R
R∑
r=1
p(w∗f |cf = j,Γ = Γ(r)),
where Γ(r) is the rth post-convergence simulation from the posterior distribution, R denotes
the total number of simulations, and p(w∗f |cf = j,Γ = Γ(r)) is known from (11). In our em-
pirical results provided in section 5, we use this method to plot various posterior predictives
and also sample directly from (11) to calculate specific features of this distribution whose
values are not known analytically.
14It is also worth noting that (11) is closely related to the skew normal random variable, and our procedure
for sampling from it can be regarded as a slight generalization of the additive construction representation of
this random [e.g., Arnold and Beaver (2003, 2004)].
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5 Empirical results
Using the model described section 4 and the algorithm fully documented in the appendix, we
fit our two equation triangular treatment-response model. We run our posterior simulator
for 50,000 simulations and discard the first 5,000 simulations as the burn-in. Numerous
generated data experiments, which are not reported here for the sake of brevity, revealed that
our algorithm mixed reasonably well (i.e., the lagged autocorrelations among our parameter
simulations were not severe, and for some parameters, resembled what would be obtained
under iid sampling), and consistently recovered parameters of the data generating process
in a variety of experimental designs (i.e., those with high and low degrees of endogeneity
and those with balanced and non-balanced frequencies for the observed consequentiality
responses). For our priors, we set µβ = 0, Vβ = (200
2)Ik, ν = 5 and R = I2, which are
reasonably non-informative choices, suggesting that information coming from the data will
dominate information added through our prior.
5.1 Diagnostic Checking
Before diving into our empirical results, we first provide some information regarding the
overall performance of our model. Our assumptions, significantly stronger than those re-
quired for popular alternatives like standard IV, involve a complete description of the joint
distribution of observables p(c,w|Γ).15 To this end, it is important to assess the appro-
priateness of these assumptions and to document potential deficiencies associated with the
model specification.
There are numerous diagnostic checks for investigating the reasonableness of a model’s as-
sumptions in the Bayesian paradigm, including, for example, the use of QQ plots [e.g.,
Lancaster (2004, Chapter 2)], posterior predictive p-values [e.g., Gelman, Carlin, Stern and
Rubin (2004, section 6.3)], and other comparisons of specific features of the model to their
counterparts in the observed data [e.g., Koop, Poirier and Tobias (2007, Chapter 11)]. We
focus here on one such exercise, which involves simulation from the posterior predictive
distribution.
15Note, given the nonlinearity of our model, standard IV would not be directly applicable.
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The idea behind this exercise is to try and replicate the distribution of the observed data,
or specific features of the data that are important to the problem at hand, based on output
from the model itself. If the model is legitimate for the analysis of a given data set, then
it is reasonable to require that the model will produce a distribution of predicted outcomes
that mimics what is found in the raw data. For example, if a simple wage regression were
run under the assumption that wages were normally distributed, the posterior predictive
density of wages would be symmetric, while the observed density of hourly wages would
have a pronounced right-skew. This exercise would therefore reveal that an assumption of
the model - namely that of normality - is inappropriate for the observed data.
To this end, we obtain a vector yrepj = [c
rep
j
′
wrepj
′
]′ from p(yrep|y) where
p(yrep|y) =
∫
RΓ
p(yrep|Γ,y)p(Γ|y)dΓ, (13)
and yrepj ∼ yrep|Γ = Γj ,y, with Γj representing the jth post-convergence draw from our
posterior simulator. The density p(yrep|Γ,y) is simply the likelihood function assumed by
the given model (which does not depend on y given Γ). In these simulations, we obtain a
vector yrepj from the conditional density p(y
rep|Γ = Γj ,y) by choosing exactly the same xc
and xw values as those that our found in our sample of data. This motivates our use of the
notation “rep” to denote replications of the observed data from the posterior predictive, i.e.,
they are “a re-run of history on the assumption that the model is what generates histories”
[Lancaster (2004, pp. 90-91)].
The act of generating a series of yrep variates in this way can be used to reveal how well the
model fares in reproducing the actual outcome distributions in our sample. Thus, for each
post-convergence simulation Γj , we draw the latent vector c˜
∗,rep using the xc values in the
sample, calculate the discrete indicator crep from this latent data, and then generate a latent
willingness to pay w∗,rep from the conditional distribution p(w∗,rep|c˜∗,rep,Γj ,xw,rep = xw).
From this final draw, we calculate the replicated willingness to pay aswrep = max{0,w∗,rep}.
We then compare features of these replicated simulations to those same features from the
observed data.
As we should expect, the posterior predictive frequencies associated with the consequentiality
responses closely match those found in the raw data. Specifically, the posterior means asso-
ciated with the fraction of observations for crep ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} were 4.4, 13.2, 38.9, 34.5 and
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8.9, while those found in the raw data were 4.1, 13.3, 39.2, 34.5 and 8.8, respectively. At the
individual level, however, the results are less encouraging. The posterior mean (and posterior
standard deviation) of the fraction of crep values that correctly predict their counterpart in
the observed data is .31 (.011). This, of course, is an improvement over randomly guessing
based on a uniform prior (which would achieve a success rate of 20 percent), but does suggest
that our covariates will not play a strong role in describing variation in consequentiality per-
ceptions. In particular, and as will be discussed in the following subsection, the instrument
will only play a small role in tracing out variation in consequentiality responses. This will
lead to reduced posterior precision associated with the “causal” effect parameters δc in (4),
which will make it more difficult to get conclusive information regarding tests of parameter
equality. It is important to note, however, that these results do not necessarily signal a
deficiency of the model’s assumptions, but simply document that it is difficult to determine
why some individuals believe the surveys are useful for policy purposes, while others believe
they have little or no value for policymaking.
To assess the adequacy of the willingness to pay distribution, we consider two primary statis-
tics: Pr(wrep > 400|y) and Pr(wrep < 60|y). The motivation for this focus is to determine if
our model can adequately recover these “tail” probabilities, while recognizing that our model
is not constructed to necessarily recover these quantities.16 In practice, it is often difficult for
a model to predict such “extreme” outcomes, making statistics such as these a useful metric
for assessing the performance of our model. Though the largest bid in our sample is $600 and
the smallest is $20, we focus our calculations instead on more “interior” bid points due to
small samples sizes and observed non-monotonicity in our sample. Specifically, just looking
at the raw data, we find that 34.6, 28.4 and 34.5 percent of our sample say they are willing
to pay bid amounts of $400, $500 and $600, respectively for the proposed water quality im-
provement. Thus, it is impossible for any model to match all of these probabilities,17 leading
us to average these frequencies for all bids greater than or equal to $400 and use this as a
basis for comparison. Performing the required calculations, we find a posterior mean (and
standard deviation) associated with the event wrep > 400 equal to .35 (.02), which is close
to and within two standard deviations of the fraction in the raw data, .32. On the other end
16A focus on the mean, for example, is a comparison that should typically be avoided, since parameters
of the model often capture the mean of the distribution of interest. The above quantities clearly rely on the
accuracy of the normality assumption.
17That is, in terms of the raw data, the fraction of observations willing to pay at least $600 will exceed
the fraction of observations willing to pay at least $500.
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of the WTP distribution, we find a posterior mean (and standard deviation) associated with
the event wrep < 60 equal to .44 (.19), while the observed fraction in the raw data is quite
close to this value at .39. Taken together, the results of these calculations do not seem to
provide any direct evidence against our model’s assumptions or that any type of re-modeling
beyond what is asserted in (3) and (4) is obviously necessary.
5.2 Parameter Estimates and Discussion of Results
Presented in Table 2 are posterior means and standard deviations associated with the pa-
rameters of our model. The continuous variables age and income are standardized to have
mean zero and unit variance for interpretation purposes and to suitably scale the values of
the associated slope parameters. In the willingness to pay equation, we treat a response
of ci = 2 as the “base category” (i.e., it takes the role of the intercept), so that all other
elements of δc are interpreted relative to this base group.
The coefficients associated with demographic variables in the willingness to pay equation are
generally consistent with our prior expectations. Females, older respondents, more educated
individuals, and those with higher incomes are more willing to pay for a given water quality
improvement. Specifically, females have a (latent) willingness to pay that is approximately
$73 more than males, on average, while the college educated have a latent WTP approxi-
mately $136 higher than their non-college counterparts. Similarly, a one-standard deviation
increase in age (approximately 15 years) is associated with an expected increase in latent
willingness to pay of approximately $26, while a similar standard deviation increase in in-
come (approximately $38,000) is associated with an expected increase in latent willingness
pay of about $92. Perhaps with the exception of the age coefficient (whose posterior prob-
ability of being positive is still reasonably high at .91), the marginal posteriors associated
with these coefficients place nearly all mass over positive values.
As suggested previously in our section on diagnostic checking, few variables emerge as influ-
ential predictors of consequentiality perceptions. Fortunately, our instrument, the indicator
denoting the receipt of the highlighted article from the Iowa Conservationist, is positively
associated with the perceived degree of consequentiality, and the posterior places virtually
all mass over positive values. Simulations from the posterior distribution were also used
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to show that receipt of the highlighted article increased the probability than an “average”
college educated-female will be in the highest consequentiality groups (i.e., ci ∈ {4, 5}) by
about 4.5 percent. Thus our instrument, though not highly influential, does play some role
in explaining variation in consequentiality perceptions. The only remaining predictor which
plays some role in the consequentiality equation is the college indicator, with the college
educated more likely to believe that the survey is definitely consequential, and less likely to
believe that it has no impact on policy decisions.
Table 2:
Posterior Means, Standard Deviations and
Probabilities of Being Positive
Consequentiality Equation
Variable E(·|y) Std(·|y) Pr(· > 0|y)
Constant 1.64 .059 1.00
Iowa Conservationist Article .103 .046 .984
Age -.02 .025 .185
Female .003 .051 .521
College .071 .053 .914
Income -.008 .026 .397
Willingness to Pay Equation
Constant (Barely Consequential) 51.34 68.56 .779
Not Consequential -192.1 106.3 .032
Moderately Consequential 34.12 60.39 .719
Consequential 57.03 98.31 .720
Definitely Consequential -63.63 150.44 .331
Age 26.48 19.30 .909
Female 72.91 39.77 .974
College 135.99 41.56 .999
Income 91.79 22.16 1.00
Covariance Matrix Parameters and Cutpoints
σ2u 3.82 ×105 7.46× 104 1.00
ρ²u .099 .076 .925
α3 .785 .045 1.00
α4 1.89 .051 1.00
α5 3.07 .060 1.00
Interestingly, we also find evidence suggesting an important role for unobserved confounding
in our application. Specifically, the posterior mean of the correlation between the errors in
(1) and (2), denoted ρcw, was found to be .099, and Pr(ρcw > 0|y) = .925. This suggests,
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with a reasonable degree of posterior certainty, that unobserved characteristics leading the
agent to believe that a survey is likely to be consequential are positively related with unob-
served factors contributing to WTP. Said differently, characteristics of people who believe
that their actions (such as responses to a survey) can make a difference correlate positively
with (unobserved) factors making a person willing to pay to see such improvements come to
fruition. Though the magnitude of this correlation is small, the fact that the marginal poste-
rior concentrates on positive values suggests the need to control for the potential endogeneity
of perceived consequentiality.
A more formal investigation regarding the importance of unobserved confounding can be
conducted by providing a test of the hypothesis ρ²u = 0. From a Bayesian point of view, this
is conducted by calculating the posterior odds ratio, K12:
K12 ≡ p(M1|y)
p(M2|y) =
p(y|M1)
p(y|M2)
p(M1)
p(M2) , (14)
where Mj denotes model j, j = 1, 2, p(Mj|y) denotes the posterior probability of model
j, p(y|Mj) =
∫
Θj
p(y|θj,Mj)p(θj|Mj)dθj is the marginal likelihood associated with model
j and p(Mj) is the prior probability associated with model j. A common convention is to
assume that both models are equally probable a priori so that the prior odds ratio cancels
in (14) and thus the posterior odds ratio K12 equals the ratio of marginal likelihoods (also
known as the Bayes factor).
To apply this model comparison method to our particular problem, let M1 denote the
restricted model with ρ²u = 0 and letM2 denote the unrestricted model in (3) and (4). For
hypotheses like this one, provided parameters common to M1 and M2 are given the same
priors in both models, the ratio of posterior odds in (14) reduces to: [see, Koop, Poirier and
Tobias (2007, page 69)]
K12 =
p(M1|y)
p(M2|y) =
p(ρ²u = 0|M2, y)
p(ρ²u = 0|M2) ,
the ratio of the marginal posterior and prior ordinate at zero under the unrestricted model.
Calculating this ratio produces a posterior odds value equal to .35, suggesting that the unre-
stricted model with ρ²u 6= 0 is favored over the restricted version by a factor of approximately
2.84 to 1. This, again, provides evidence supporting the need to control for unobserved con-
founding and the endogeneity of consequentiality perceptions in our application.
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Figure 2: Willingness to Pay Posterior Predictive Distributions for 5 Consequentiality Groups
5.3 Do the data support the knife-edge theoretical predictions?
As mentioned previously in the paper, we are primarily interested in determining if the
WTP distributions, and specific features of those distributions, are equal for individuals
with varying, but positive, perceptions regarding the survey’s consequentiality. Specifically,
previous theoretical work would seem to suggest that those individuals believing the survey
to be completely inconsequential (i.e., ci = 1) may report a different willingness to pay than
everyone else, while those believing the survey to be at least minimally consequential (i.e.,
ci > 1) should report the same willingness to pay.
Our first step in the investigation of this question is to plot the posterior predictive willingness
to pay distributions for the various consequentiality groups, using the methodology described
in section 4.3 of the paper. These plots are presented in Figure 2, and are calculated, for
simplicity, for a college-educated female of average age and income who received the article
touting the importance of the survey. What we take away from Figure 2 is some evidence
that is broadly consistent with the knife-edge theoretical predictions. The implied WTP
distributions for the group believing the survey to be completely inconsequential (c = 1)
seems rather different from those of the other groups, and the remaining densities seem
mostly similar.
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Of course, the predictive WTP distributions in the figure unite two conceptually different
sources of information. First, they account for the direct “structural” impacts of conse-
quentiality perceptions on willingness to pay through the δc coefficients. Second, they also
account for the role of unobservables and the fact that individuals believing the survey to be
very consequential have, on average, unobserved characteristics that also make them more
likely to pay for a given environmental improvement. As a test of the theory, what seems to
be of primary interest is a comparison of the structural coefficients. If differences in the WTP
distributions for those with c ≥ 2 arise only because of differences in unobservables across
groups, then the findings of our analysis are still consistent with the theoretical, knife-edge
predictions. That is, any differences in willingness to pay can be interpreted as arising only
from the observational nature of the survey itself, since, in the survey area, we are not able to
randomly assign individuals to groups where all factors will be, on average, balanced across
the groups. Conversely, if the structural parameters are significantly different, this suggests
persistent WTP differences that can not be explained through differences in unobservables,
and could potentially be argued to be at odds with previous theoretical and experimental
predictions.
Table 3: Posterior Probabilities and
Posterior Predictive WTP Statistics Across
Different Levels of Consequentiality
Consequentiality Response
Variable 1 2 3 4 5
Pr(δc1 > ·|y) —– —– —– —– —–
Pr(δc2 > ·|y) .98 —– —– —– —–
Pr(δc3 > ·|y) .97 .44 —– —– —–
Pr(δc4 > ·|y) .94 .51 .64 —– —–
Pr(δc5 > ·|y) .73 .29 .20 .08 —–
Median WTP 0 $171.06 $264.9 $355.0 $306.2
Mean WTP $ 218.44 $349.42 $ 404.67 $ 468.12 $434.22
To compare these structural coefficients more formally, we report a variety of quantities of
interest in Table 3. For the first set of entries of the table, we calculate posterior probabilities
of the form Pr(δcj > δck|y) ∀j, k ∈ {1, . . . , 5}.18 These parameters, and the corresponding
probabilities mentioned above, are what researchers might typically look to first as a “test”
18For example, the table can be used to show that Pr(δc2 > δc1|y) = .98, and similarly for the remaining
entries.
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of the theory. As is evident from the table, the subgroup who perceives the survey as
being completely irrelevant for policy purposes clearly has lower willingness to pay than
those who believe the survey to be somewhat consequential, and also a lower (though this
statement is made with far less certainty) WTP than those regarding the survey as completely
consequential. This result is consistent with the CGM theoretical predictions, wherein the
behavior of individuals believing that the survey is irrelevant can not be characterized; our
results suggest that these individuals have different WTP reports than the remaining groups,
supporting the notion that these agents and their reports can be excluded in practice.
There is also reasonably strong evidence that, among those believing the survey to be at
least minimally consequential, the structural impacts across groups are not obviously distin-
guishable. This is evident from the fact, apart from the comparison between groups 4 and
5, most of the probabilities found in the table do not seem to provide strong evidence of
parameter differences.
To investigate this issue more formally, we revisit equation (14) and calculate Bayes factors
associated with the individual restrictions δcj = 0, for j ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5}. We would regard our
analysis as providing support for the theoretical predictions if the Bayes factor associated
with δc1 favored keeping the indicator in the model, while those associated with δc3, δc4 and
δc5 favored excluding the indicators from the model. When performing these calculations,
we find Bayes factors in favor of the zero restriction equal to .36, 2.93, 1.74 and 1.20 for
j = 1, 3, 4, 5, respectively. Thus, by a factor of approximately 2.8 to 1, we support keep-
ing the indicator for the inconsequential group in the model, and also support (to varying
degrees), dropping the remaining consequentiality indicators.19 Again, these results provide
support for the knife-edge theoretical predictions; similar WTP distributions emerge for
those believing the survey to be minimally consequential, while those believing the survey to
be completely inconsequential have different WTP distributions, even after accounting for
unobserved differences across the groups.
Given the non-experimental nature of our date, it is important to note that our results are
19It is seemingly important here to mention Bartlett’s paradox, where the restricted model receives larger
and larger support as the prior becomes increasingly non-informative. More non-informative priors (those
with prior standard deviations for the δ parameters greater than 200) will only lead to stronger evidence
in favor of the restrictions, i.e., more support for the equality of WTP distributions for those believing the
survey to be at least somewhat consequential.
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subject to an alternative interpretation. The issue here arises from a subtle, yet conceptually
important issue regarding truthful revelation of preferences versus equality of WTP distri-
butions. With our non-experimental data, it could be the case that individuals in different
consequentiality groups simply have different willingnesses to pay. This problem is likely to
be substantially mitigated given our efforts to control for observed and unobserved (through
the selection component of the model) differences across groups, but its presence could still
remain. In other words, if we fit the model and find that the δc parameters are different, we
could interpret this result in one of two ways: individuals are truthful (consistent with the
CGM predictions) yet have different WTP distributions, or the parameter differences are
suggestive that individuals are not truthful (at odds with CGM). If this were to happen, our
assumption would be that we are adequately controlling for unobserved differences across
groups (through controlling for the endogeneity of consequentiality) so that differences in
the parameters are most likely attributable to non-truthful revelation of preferences. On
the other hand, if we find evidence of parameter equality for those believing the survey
is at least somewhat consequential, and inequality for those believing the survey is irrele-
vant, then again we have two interpretations: parameter equality implies the same behavior
for the consequential groups, thus supporting the idea of truthful responses, or parameter
equality persists yet the reports are not truthful. This latter explanation of the results is
more difficult to rationalize, as it would require a type of misreporting on the part of agents
believing the survey to be minimally consequential which cancels, on average, leading to pa-
rameter equality, and a different kind of behavior for the inconsequential agents which leads
to differences in parameters. While this event is certainly possible, it seems to be reasonably
unlikely. Thus, our results providing evidence of parameter equality among those believing
the survey has some degree of consequentiality, and parameter inequality for those believing
the survey is completely irrelevant for policy, are, we believe, consistent with and supportive
of the CGM predictions. However, given the above discussion, we acknowledge the need to
interpret this finding with some caution.20
20This interpretation concern potentially applies to field experiments as well in which respondents are
informed of the consequentiality of the survey. Specifically, by informing respondents thus, individuals may
alter their perception of the value of the good being considered.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we have offered an empirical evidence in support of a theoretical result in the
contingent valuation literature. Specifically, we have investigated the hypothesis of whether
willingness to pay distributions are equal for those individuals who believe the survey has at
least some potential for shaping policy decisions.
Using a treatment-response model that controls for unobserved confounding and exploits a
survey design in which a subsample of individuals are randomly provided supporting mate-
rial documenting the importance of the study, we find evidence that is broadly consistent
with most previous theoretical and experimental predictions. That is, we find support for
the equality of WTP distributions among those believing the survey is at least minimally
consequential, while those believing the survey will have no effect on policy have statisti-
cally different distributions associated with WTP. Our methodology also make use of a new
Bayesian posterior simulator for fitting the nonlinear treatment-response model, which we
hope will appeal to other researchers seeking to estimate models with a similar structure.
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7 Appendix: The Gibbs Sampling Algorithm
As is well-known in the literature, the standard Gibbs sampler in ordered outcome analyses
can suffer from slow mixing. We propose to mitigate this slow mixing problem by sampling
the cutpoints α˜ and latent variables c˜ and w˜ in a single step. We will do this via the
method of composition, by drawing, in order, from the posterior conditionals p(α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w),
p(c˜∗|α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) and p(w∗|c˜∗, α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w).
The parameter vector is partitioned into three blocks, and a strategy for drawing from each
of these blocks is described below. The first block consists of three separate pieces, crafted
to draw directly from p(w∗, c˜∗, α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w). Finally, in what follows, we let Γ denote all
parameters in the model and Γ−x represent all parameters other than x.
Step 1A: Drawing from p(α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w).
First, note that
p(α˜, c˜∗, w˜∗|β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ p(α˜)
n∏
i=1
p(c˜∗i , w
∗
i |β˜, Σ˜)p(ci|c˜∗i , α˜)p(wi|w∗i ). (15)
Thus, we obtain
p(α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ p(α˜)
n∏
i=1
∫ α˜ci+1
α˜ci
∫ wi
wi
p(c˜∗i , w
∗
i |β˜, Σ˜)dw∗i dc˜∗i .
In the above, we have defined
wi =
{
Bi if wi = 1
−∞ if wi = 0 and wi =
{ ∞ if wi = 1
Bi if wi = 0
.
Since the cutpoints α˜3 and α˜4 are only involved in the above expression for i such that
ci ∈ {2, 3, 4}, we can write:
p(α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ p(α˜)
∏
i:ci∈{2,3,4}
Pr(α˜ci < c˜
∗
i ≤ α˜ci+1 , wi < w∗i ≤ wi|β˜, Σ˜)
= p(α˜)
∏
i:ci∈{2,3,4}
Pr
(
α˜ci − xciβ˜c
γ
<
c˜∗i − xciβ˜c
γ
≤ α˜ci+1 − xciβ˜c
γ
,
wi − xwiβw − ciδ
σu
<
w∗i − xwiβw − ciδ
σu
≤ wi − xwiβw − ciδ
σu
)
.
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Though routines for directly calculating joint probabilities like those above are often not
available in standard software packages, files for calculating the (standardized) bivariate
normal cdf are often available. To make use of such routines to calculate the above, we first
let ρcw = Σ˜(1, 2)/
√
Σ˜(1, 1)
√
Σ˜(2, 2) = σcw/σw and define the (standardized) bivariate cdf
notation:
Φ(a, b; ρ) = Pr(z1 ≤ a, z2 ≤ b; ρ)
where z1 and z2 are univariate normal random variables with zero mean, unit variances and
correlation ρ.
Since
Pr(al < z1 < au, bl < z2 < bu; ρ) = Pr(z1 < au, z2 < bu; ρ)− Pr(z1 < al, z2 < bu; ρ)
−Pr(z1 < au, z2 < bl; ρ) + Pr(z1 < al, z2 < bl; ρ)
= Φ(au, bu; ρ)−Φ(al, bu; ρ)−Φ(au, bl; ρ) +Φ(al, bl; ρ),
we can write
p(α˜|β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ p(α˜)
∏
i:ci∈{2,3,4}
[
Φ(Ai, Di; ρcw)−Φ(Ai, Di; ρcw)−Φ(Ai, Di; ρcw)+Φ(Ai, Di; ρcw)
]
(16)
where
Ai =
α˜ci − xciβ˜c
γ
, Ai =
α˜ci+1 − xciβ˜c
γ
, Di =
wi − xwiβw − ciδ
σu
and Di =
wi − xwiβw − ciδ
σu
.
The conditional posterior above is not of a recognizable form, and thus we employ a Metropolis-
Hastings step for sampling from (15). Specifically, building upon the idea of Cowles (1996),
we make use of a random-walk type chain which incorporates the ordering and truncation
restrictions on the elements of α˜.
To this end, we let α˜(t−1) denote the current value of the chain. Implementation of the M-H
step requires the specification of a proposal density or jumping distribution, which we denote
as q(α˜|α˜(t−1)). This proposal density governs the likelihood of movement to α˜ = α˜(t) given
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that the chain is currently at α˜(t−1) . For this application, we choose
q(α˜|α˜(t−1)) = q(α˜3|α˜(t−1))q(α˜4|α˜3, α˜(t−1))
=
 φ(α˜3; α˜(t−1)3 , d21)
Φ
(
α˜
(t−1)
4 −α˜(t−1)3
d1
)
− Φ
(
−α˜(t−1)3
d1
)
 I [0 < α˜3 < α˜(t−1)4 ]
×
 φ(α˜4; α˜(t−1)4 , d22)
Φ
(
1−α˜(t−1)4
d2
)
− Φ
(
α˜3−α˜(t−1)4
d2
)
 I [α˜3 < α˜4 < 1] .
In other words, we decompose our transition kernel into a marginal for α˜3 and a conditional
for α˜4 given α˜3 (where both are conditioned on the current value of the chain, α˜
(t−1)). For
the first of these, α˜3 is sampled from a normal distribution with mean equal to the chain’s
current value (denoted α˜
(t−1)
3 ) and variance d
2
1 which is truncated to the interval (0, α˜
(t−1)
4 ).
For the second step, we sample α˜4 from a normal density with mean α˜
(t−1)
4 and variance d
2
2
which is truncated to the interval (α˜3, 1) (where α˜3 was obtained from the first step).
With this choice of proposal density, we sample α˜cand from q(α˜|α˜(t−1)) and accept α˜cand as
a draw from the conditional with probability:
min
{
p(α˜cand|β˜, Σ˜, c,w)
p(α˜t−1|β˜, Σ˜, c,w)
q(α˜t−1|α˜cand)
q(α˜cand|α˜(t−1)) , 1
}
,
where the target and proposal density ordinates are obtained from (15) and the form of
the transition kernel described above. If the candidate draw is not accepted, we set the
current value of the chain α˜ equal to its previous value, i.e., α˜ = α˜t−1. In practice, we
set d1 = d2 = .01, which produced reasonable acceptance rates (near 40 percent) and also
seemed to perform well in generated data experiments.
Step 1B: Drawing from p(c˜∗|α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w)
To implement full blocking procedure, where α˜, c˜∗ and w∗ are sampled together in a single
step, we would need to draw from the posterior conditional:
p(c˜∗i |α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w), i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
where w∗ has been integrated out of the model.
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In this regard, note that, from (5),
p(c˜∗i |α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ p(ci|c˜∗i , α˜)
∫ wi
wi
p(c˜∗i , w
∗
i |β˜, Σ˜)dw∗i .
We perform this integration by breaking the joint distribution of p(c˜∗i , w
∗
i |β˜, Σ˜) into the
conditional p(w∗i |c˜∗i , β˜, Σ˜) times the marginal p(c˜∗i |β˜, Σ˜).
The latter of these is simply:
c˜∗i |β˜, Σ˜ ∼ N(xciβ˜c, σ˜2c )
and the former is:
w∗i |c˜∗i , β˜, Σ˜ ∼ N
(
xwiβw + ciδ + [σ˜cw/σ˜
2
c ](c˜
∗
i − xciβ˜c), σ2w(1− ˜ρ2cw)
)
.
So, when performing the necessary integration, we obtain, when wi = 1:
p(c˜∗i |α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ φ(c˜∗i ;xciβ˜c, σ˜2c )
[
1− Φ
(
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ − [σ˜cw/σ˜2c ](c˜∗i − xciβ˜c)
σw
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)]
(17)
×I(α˜ci < c˜∗i ≤ α˜ci+1).
Similarly, when wi = 0, we get
p(c˜∗i |α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ φ(c˜∗i ;xciβ˜c, σ˜2c )
[
Φ
(
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ − [σ˜cw/σ˜2c ](c˜∗i − xciβ˜c)
σw
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)]
(18)
×I(α˜ci < c˜∗i ≤ α˜ci+1).
This density is, again, not of a standard form. To make this blocking step feasible and
preferable relative to a standard Gibbs algorithm, we require a fast method for generating
draws from (16) and (17), since this must be done for each observation in the sample. Here
we make use of the auxiliary variable Gibbs sampling technique of Damien et al. (1999) as
a quick and efficient way of generating these draws. To illustrate its use, we first consider
the case where w = 1 so that our goal is to sample from (16). To this end, we introduce a
set of auxiliary variables ui, i = 1, 2, . . . , n where
ui|c∗i , α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ind∼ U
(
0,
[
1− Φ
(
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ − [σ˜cw/σ˜2c](c˜∗i − xciβ˜c)
σw
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)])
,
(19)
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a series of independent, uniform random variables over the given interval. It follows that the
joint distribution of ui and c
∗
i is
p(ui, c
∗
i |α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w) ∝ φ(c˜∗i ;xciβ˜c, σ˜2c )I(α˜ci < c˜∗i ≤ α˜ci+1)
×I
(
0 < ui <
[
1− Φ
(
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ − [σ˜cw/σ˜2c](c˜∗i − xciβ˜c)
σw
√
1− ρ˜2cw
)])
.
At this point, a simple Gibbs sampler can be constructed, which draws from ui|c˜∗i , · and
c˜∗i |ui, ·. At then end of this subroutine, the last c˜∗i simulation is retained and kept as a draw
from the desired conditional distribution. The first of these conditionals is easy to draw
from, and is given by (18). The second involves working out the conditional for c˜∗i . To this
end, let
h∗1i ≡ xciβc +
σ˜c
ρ˜
[
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ
σw
+ Φ−1(ui)
√
1− ρ˜2
]
.
Then,
c˜∗i |ui, ·, wi = 1 ∼
{
TN(max{α˜ci ,h∗1i},α˜ci+1)(xciβc, σ˜
2
c ) if ρ > 0
TN(α˜ci ,min{α˜ci+1,h∗1i})(xciβc, σ˜
2
c ) if ρ < 0
.
Note, of course, that when ρ = 0, the above is undefined. However, unless ρ = 0 is set
as the initial condition of the chain, a simulated correlation identically equal to zero will
never occur and moreover, when ρ = 0 the desired conditionals in (16) and (17) reduce to
truncated normal distributions, and auxiliary variable methods are not required.
In a similar manner, when wi = 0, we first define
h∗0i ≡ xciβc +
σ˜c
ρ˜
[
Bi − xwiβw − ciδ
σw
− Φ−1(ui)
√
1− ρ˜2
]
.
It follows that
c˜∗i |ui, ·, wi = 0 ∼
{
TN(max{α˜ci ,h∗1i},α˜ci+1)(xciβc, σ˜
2
c ) if ρ < 0
TN(α˜ci ,min{α˜ci+1,h∗1i})(xciβc, σ˜
2
c ) if ρ > 0
.
In practice, when we get to Step 1B of our algorithm, we run this subroutine for 20 it-
erations to obtain the desired c˜∗ draws. Our initial step in this process samples c∗i
ind∼
TN(α˜ci ,α˜ci+1)(xciβc, σ˜
2
c ), guaranteeing that the regions of truncation defined above are well-
defined. We evaluated the performance of this method in numerous generated data experi-
ments, and found that it converged within only a few iterations, with 20 being adequate for
a burn-in. Moreover, the code for this step can be completely vectorized, and the required
distributions are easily sampled.
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Step 1C: Drawing from p(w∗|c˜∗, α˜, β˜, Σ˜, c,w).
With draws obtained from Steps 1A and 1B, we can then draw each w∗i from its complete
posterior conditional. That is, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
w∗i |Γ−w∗i , c,w ∼
 TN[Bi,∞)
(
xwiβw + ciδc +
σ˜²u
σ˜2²
[c˜∗i − xciβ˜c], σ2u(1− ρ˜2²u)
)
if w1 = 1
TN(−∞,Bi)
(
xwiβw + ciδc +
σ˜²u
σ˜2²
[c˜∗i − xciβ˜c], σ2u(1− ρ˜2²u)
)
if w1 = 0.
Step 2: Drawing from p(β˜|Γ−β˜, c,w).
First, define
Xi =
[
xci 0 0
0 xwi ci
]
.
Then, similar to a SUR model [e.g., Koop, Poirier and Tobias (2007, pages 138-138)], we
obtain
β˜|Γ−β˜, c,w ∼ N(Dβdβ,Dβ)
where
Dβ =
(∑
i
X′iΣ˜
−1
Xi +V
−1
β
)−1
and dβ =
∑
i
X′iΣ˜
−1
[
c˜∗i
w∗i
]
+V−1β µβ.
Step 3: Drawing from p(Σ˜
−1|Γ−Σ˜−1 , c,w).
Finally, again making use of techniques like those employed in the SUR model, we obtain
Σ˜
−1|Γ−Σ˜−1 , c,w ∼ W
[∑
i
[
²˜i
ui
]
[²˜i ui] +R
−1
]−1
, n+ ν
 .
A Gibbs sampler proceeds by simulating (in order) from these posterior conditional distri-
butions.
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